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Abstract.  Each quarter, banks file a call report, or Report of Condition and Income, containing
hundreds of accounting items pertaining to their financial condition.  Because call reports are
filed quarterly, whereas banks are typically examined about once every twelve to eighteen
months, statistical early warning models using call report data potentially provide a more up-to-
date picture of a bank’s condition than on-site exams alone.  Often neglected, however, is the fact
that call report data are subject to revision.  We find evidence of a strong relationship between
on-site exams and call report revisions.  In addition, we evaluate a major class of early warning
models using both originally published and revised data to assess whether model accuracy in real
time is appreciably lower than accuracy measured using revised data.  The findings indicate
revised data overstate the accuracy of early warning models.  The substantial effect of revisions
on the accuracy of early warning models, coupled with the finding of a relationship between
revisions and exams, points to a substantial auditing role for on-site exams.  More generally, our
findings point to the need for care in the use of call report data for research in which the real-time
flow of financial information is of some concern. 
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Efforts requiring banks to divulge information on their financial condition have a long
history.  In the early 1800s, some states required banks to file reports of condition with the
governor or legislature, arguing the state was a shareholder in the banks and therefore entitled to
the information (Robertson 1995).  However, the reports contained only broad breakdowns of
assets and liabilities and no information bank directors did not wish to disclose.  In 1869,
Congress empowered the comptroller of the currency to “call” for a full statement of condition
from national banks several times a year.  Regulators since have made many changes to the
resulting call report, but its purpose remains the same—to provide timely information regarding
the condition of banks.
The modern call report, or Report of Condition and Income, is filed quarterly by all banks
and contains hundreds of accounting items that regulators and private analysts use to characterize
the financial condition of both individual banks and the industry.  Call reports now include
detailed measures of assets, liabilities, revenues, expenses, and off-balance-sheet activity.  The
level of detail is somewhat greater for large banks than for small ones, but even small banks file
an extensive report.
Because call reports are filed quarterly, whereas banks are typically examined about once
every twelve to eighteen months, call report data potentially provide a more up-to-date picture of
a bank’s condition than on-site exams alone.  For this reason, both regulators and private-sector
analysts use call report data extensively in a variety of efforts to monitor banks’ condition.  One
such effort involves the construction and implementation of statistical early warning models to
identify emerging financial problems.  These statistical systems typically rely heavily on call
report data for input variables.  However, if call report information does not accurately reflect- 2 -
financial conditions when published, the report’s usefulness in tracking financial developments
between on-site exams could be reduced.  Additionally, if inaccuracies in the call report data are
ultimately corrected, analysis based on the revised data might overstate the report’s usefulness in
tracking financial developments in real time, as Cole and Gunther (1998) point out.    
These considerations suggest the need for analyzing whether the accuracy of early
warning models in identifying financial problems in real time is appreciably lower than accuracy
measured using revised data.  Toward this end, we estimate a type of early warning model
designed to predict the results of on-site exams.  Cole, Cornyn, and Gunther (1995) present a
model of this type employed by the Federal Reserve to monitor financial conditions at individual
banks.  An example from the academic literature is Wang and Sauerhaft (1989).  Our analysis
distinguishes itself by estimating the model using real-time data, in addition to revised data.  The
findings indicate revised data overstate the accuracy of early warning models, as the relationship
between call report data and the results of supervisory exams is significantly weaker for real-time
data than for revised data.  Out-of-sample results also indicate a relatively low level of accuracy
for real-time data.  The substantial effect of revisions on the accuracy of early warning models,
coupled with the finding of a relationship between revisions and exams, points to a substantial
auditing role for on-site exams.  More generally, our findings point to the need for care in the use
of call report data for research in which the real-time flow of financial information is of some
concern.
2.  Background
Deterioration in loan portfolios typically has been the primary proximate cause of
downturns in the banking sector.  Reflecting this stylized fact, variables related to asset quality- 3 -
1 In first-quarter 1998, banks began reporting provision for credit losses and no longer reported provision
for loan and lease losses.  The new provision covers loan and lease losses but also includes provisions for losses on
certain types of off-balance-sheet activity.  For simplicity, we refer to provision expense in all years as provision for
loan and lease losses.  Banks continue to report ALLL and now also report an allowance for credit losses, which
includes the allowance for losses on off-balance-sheet activity.  Comparing the two quantities makes it possible to
estimate the size of the provision for losses on off-balance-sheet activity.  The provision for losses on this activity is
very small overall in comparison with the provision for loan and lease losses, and for the vast majority of banks the
provision for off-balance-sheet losses is zero.
generally have a large role in early warning models.  The banking industry uses a specialized
system to account for loan quality problems, at the heart of which is the allowance for loan and
lease losses (ALLL).  Through provision for loan and lease losses, banks add funds to ALLL. 
These provisions are an expense item and reduce a bank’s net income.  The ALLL balance is
subtracted from total loans, so that loans on the balance sheet are reported net of ALLL.  When
loans are charged off, total loans are reduced by the amount of the losses, but the losses are
charged against ALLL, leaving net loans unaffected.  If a bank recovers some of the losses on
loans previously charged off, the recoveries are added back to ALLL.
When a bank charges off a loan, the resulting loss does not affect reported profitability,
since the charge-off is against ALLL.  Credit quality problems affect reported profitability when
a bank incurs the provision expense, since the expense directly reduces net income.  As a result,
timely disclosure of information on credit quality and its impact on overall operating results
depends on the degree to which provisions are made in anticipation of, or concurrent with, actual
impairment in the loan portfolio.  If adequate provisions are made only after the impairment
occurs, profitability prior to the provisions is overstated.  Because of their close relationship with
credit quality difficulties, provisions are an obvious candidate for inclusion in early warning
models.
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2 In addition to examiner review, a bank’s loan-loss accounting may be reviewed by independent auditors. 
While all commercial banks are subject to exams, not all are subject to external audits.  The Federal Reserve requires
bank holding companies with consolidated assets of $500 million or more to have an annual external audit.  New
banks are also required to have external audits.  The Securities and Exchange Commission requires audits for
publicly traded companies, including bank holding companies.  Finally, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 requires annual external audits for any bank insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp. with assets greater than $500 million (Federal Reserve Board of Governors 1994).
One factor that might prompt banks to set an insufficient level of ALLL and provision
expense involves regulatory or market-based penalties for a deterioration in financial condition. 
Risk-based capital requirements allow banks to count ALLL only in Tier 2 capital and only up to
1.25 percent of risk-weighted assets.  By not making the necessary provisions, banks with asset-
quality problems can raise reported net income and retained earnings, thereby boosting Tier 1
capital and potentially avoiding the numerous restrictions regulators typically place on troubled
banks. 
Given the current institutional framework, which assigns regulators a large role in the
monitoring and disciplining of banks, the incentive to underreport provisions provides a
particularly strong reason for regulatory exams.  The Commercial Bank Examination Manual
states that “the examiner’s responsibility to determine the adequacy of a bank’s ALLL is one of
the most important functions of any examination” (Federal Reserve Board of Governors 1999). 
In verifying the adequacy of ALLL, examiners consider information obtained during the current
and prior exams, loan quality trends and peer group data, processes for internal credit review,
past-due and restructured loans, and economic conditions.  If, after considering these factors, an
examiner finds that a bank’s ALLL is too low, the institution normally is required to increase its
provision expense and raise ALLL to the desired level.
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Several studies support the view that troubled banks often have insufficient ALLL and
that exams are important in helping correct the problem.  The General Accounting Office (1990,
1991) finds troubled or failing banks often have insufficient ALLL.  Similarly, Berger, King, and
O’Brien (1991) discuss the potential for insufficient ALLL, particularly when a bank has not
been examined recently.
Setting provisions requires detailed knowledge about a bank’s loan portfolio.  Regulators
and, especially, bank managers are more likely than outsiders to have such detailed knowledge. 
If an exam aligns provision expense and ALLL with credit quality, it may facilitate the public
communication of important bank-specific information and thereby enhance banking system
transparency.
Consistent with this view, Docking, Hirschey, and Jones (1997) find a bank’s
announcement of loan-loss provisions adversely affects both that bank’s stock price and
sometimes the stock price of other banks as well.  Berger and Davies (1998) provide evidence
that quarterly financial statements are a conduit for transmitting exam findings to financial
markets.  And Flannery and Houston (1999) find exams affect the relationship between a bank
holding company’s market and book value, possibly reflecting the improved accuracy of
financial statements following an exam or a certification effect whereby exams serve as a stamp
of approval on published financial statements.
Other researchers have reached a different conclusion, however, arguing essentially that
outsiders can see through a bank’s loan-loss accounting and discern the true quality of its loans,
even if provisions and ALLL are lower than necessary.  Wall and Koch (2000) cite several
studies that indicate investors often do not react to announcements of loan-loss provisions,- 6 -
3 Not all exam findings on provisions necessarily require call report revisions.  If additional provisions are
necessary, the expense may simply be reflected on a bank’s subsequent call report.
presumably having already effectively estimated the extent of the deterioration in bank loan
portfolios.  If, without substantial cost, outsiders can accurately estimate losses in a bank’s loan
portfolio on the basis of other information, the benefits of exams in assessing loan quality and the
sufficiency of ALLL may be limited mostly to the supervisory process itself, as opposed to the
promotion of financial transparency in general. 
The potential importance of provision expense in early warning models suggests call
report revisions, insofar as they reflect exam findings pointing to the need for further provisions,
may affect the measured accuracy of early warning models.  If examiners determine that the
provision expense a bank reports is inadequate, they may require the bank to make additional
provisions and refile one or more recent call reports to reflect the change.
3  In this case, a
potentially significant gap arises between the real-time and revised data.  If the originally
published data report a level of provisions that is subsequently found to be too low, then the
revised data, which reflects more adequate provisions, would provide a more accurate view of
credit quality and, as a result, might generate more accurate predictions regarding supervisory
outcomes.  Previous studies have only used revised data to assess the accuracy of early warning
models.
3.  Data
3.1.  Revisions and sample design
The quarterly data this study uses are limited to commercial banks, 1996–98.  The
originally reported data are from files transmitted from the Federal Reserve Board, seventy to- 7 -
4 As regulators process call report data, substantial effort is devoted to validating the reported information. 
The primary goal is to ensure the data are accurate before they are published as “final.”  While the data are typically
published about sixty-five days after the report date, revisions can be made for up to five years.
eighty days following the report dates.  The revised data are for the same report dates but were
transmitted from the Board in May 2000.  Any differences between the original data and the data
obtained in May reflect revisions made sometime after the data were published as “final,” which
typically occurs about sixty-five days after the report date.
4
Several additional restrictions frame the analysis.  First, the sample is limited to banks
that received a satisfactory rating on the last exam prior to the report date.  Satisfactory status
corresponds to a safety and soundness rating of 1 or 2.  Safety and soundness ratings of 3, 4, and
5 are considered unsatisfactory.  Focusing on banks entering a period with a satisfactory rating
facilitates an assessment of whether new or emerging problems are freely divulged by banks or
reported only at the behest of examiners.  In addition, banks less than four years old are excluded,
since young banks typically exhibit unique financial characteristics and are not directly
comparable to more mature banks.  The resulting sample contains 100,222 call reports for the
period from 1996 through 1998.
3.2.  Variables
The early warning model we use to predict the results of bank exams includes seven
financial ratios related to the major elements of financial condition considered by examiners. 
Each of the seven variables is measured relative to total assets.  Total capital (CAP) is our
measure of capital adequacy.  High values for this variable should reduce the chances of an
unsatisfactory exam rating.  Problem loans are represented by loans past due 90 days or more and
still accruing (PD90) and nonaccrual loans (NON).  Provision expense (PRO) is also included in- 8 -
the model.  High values of the three variable measuring credit problems should increase the
chances of a problem exam rating.  Earnings are represented by the return on assets (ROA) and
are expected to reduce the chances of an inferior exam rating.  As a measure of liquidity,
investment securities (SEC) should reduce the chances of a problem exam rating, whereas a high
reliance on large CDS (LCD) is expected to have the opposite effect.
Besides the financial ratios, two additional variables are included to capture the potential
effects of supervisory status and bank size.  If a bank received a rating of 2 on its most recent
prior exam, the variable SUP2 is equal to one, and zero otherwise.  This variable should be
positively associated with downgrades, since 2-rated banks are closer to problem status than 1-
rated banks.  The log of total assets, SIZE, may reduce the chances of a downgrade if largeness
provides financial strength, through either a greater ability to diversify risk or a closer
relationship with the broader financial market.   
3.3.  Averages by revision category  
Table 1 displays average values for each of the seven financial ratios.  For each ratio, an
average is calculated for the cases in which the underlying data were not revised.  For cases
where a ratio is higher based on the revised data than on the original data, averages are calculated
using both sets of data.  Two sets of averages are also calculated for cases in which revisions
result in a lower value of a ratio.  The number of cases of no revision, an upward revision, and a
downward revision are shown in parentheses.  To allow for potential seasonality in revisions, the
data are separated into four groups by calendar quarter.  The data for each quarter span three
years.  Income statement data for the first three quarters are annualized.- 9 -
As shown in Table 1, the originally submitted call report data are revised only
infrequently.  However, the fourth quarter call report is subject to a noticeably larger number of
revisions than the others, possibly reflecting heightened attention to the year-end income
statement covering an entire four quarters.  For this reason, we continue to analyze the data by
quarter throughout our investigation.
The revisions are small on average.  However, a notable exception to this latter
observation are upward revisions to the provision expense ratio.  For the first and second
quarters, PRO, the ratio of provision expense to total assets, doubles on average when it is
revised upward.  In addition, the lower portion of Table 1 shows the incidence and magnitude of
changes in PRO associated with revisions to the level of loan loss provisions; that is, changes in
PRO resulting from revisions to the reported level of total assets, but not loan loss provisions, are
included in the category of no revision.  For this subset of total revisions, the magnitude of
upward revisions is even greater, in the lowest case more than doubling and in the highest
increasing by a factor of seven.
4.  Results
4.1.  Exams and revisions
The number of upward revisions in our sample is fairly small.  However, these were good
times for the banking industry.  Because financial problems were few, the need for increases in
provisions, for example, could be expected to have been low.  As a first step in analyzing the
effect of data revisions on early warning models, we investigate the degree to which revisions are
associated with emerging financial difficulties.- 10 -
In Table 2, we divide the observations into three groups corresponding to the banks’
exam status in the subsequent quarter.  The first group contains banks not examined in the
subsequent quarter.  The second group was examined and remained in nonproblem status, while
the third group was examined and received an unsatisfactory rating.  We then compare across
groups the incidence of upward revisions to provision expense.  Banks receiving an
unsatisfactory rating had a much higher incidence of upward revisions than banks that were not
examined or were examined but remained in satisfactory status.  Looking at the fourth quarter, 36
percent of the downgraded banks revised upward their originally reported level of provision
expense.  For each of the four quarters, the incidence of upward revisions is highest for the
problem group of banks.  The null hypothesis of no association between exam and revision
category is rejected for each quarter at the 1-percent significance level.
The association between exam results and call report revisions raises the likelihood that
the accuracy of early warning models used to predict exam findings is lower for real-time data
than for the revised data typically employed in research.  While revisions are few in our sample,
they are associated with supervisory downgrades, the very outcome the early warning models we
use are designed to predict.
In addition, the significant relationship between exams and revisions is direct evidence of
a significant role for exams in uncovering financial problems and ensuring bank accounting
statements reflect them.  To the extent outsiders use provisions and ALLL in assessing loan
quality, these results support the view that exams are important in the public dissemination of
accurate information on banks’ financial condition.- 11 -
4.2.  Regressions
The explanatory variables are used to explain supervisory downgrades to problem status
in the quarter following the report date.  As such, the model uses a bank’s most recent accounting
data to predict whether the bank is likely to receive a substandard rating during an on-site
supervisory exam.  The estimation sample is limited to banks examined in the subsequent
quarter.  We use the probit model in our estimations.   
The probit regression results based on the originally reported data are shown in Table 3. 
Most of the variables are significant and possess the expected sign in each quarter.  The
exceptions are CAP, which is insignificant in three of the four regressions, and SEC and LCD,
which are insignificant in the fourth quarter. 
Estimation results using the revised data are shown in Table 4.  Again, most of the
variables are significant and possess the expected sign in each quarter.  The exceptions are CAP,
which is again insignificant in three of the four regressions, SEC, which is again insignificant in
the fourth quarter, and LCD, which is now insignificant in the second and fourth quarters.  The
lack of consistent significance for CAP suggests book-value capitalization, while important in
determining a bank’s long-run viability, does not necessarily register problems in the early stages
of financial deterioration.  
Overall, the two sets of regressions are highly similar.  Any substantial impact of data
revisions on predictive accuracy is not immediately apparent from the coefficient estimates
themselves.
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5 For early warning models in banking, the most relevant levels of type-2 error arguably are in the range of
5 to 20 percent.     
4.3.  In-sample error rates
Figure 1 shows the in-sample error rates associated with using first quarter data to predict
second quarter downgrades.  The percentage of problem banks identified as nonproblem banks is
referred to as the type-1 error rate.  The percentage of nonproblem banks identified as problem
banks is referred to as the type-2 error rate.  A low type-1 error rate for a given rate of type-2
error indicates superior predictive performance.
5  The model using revised data is clearly superior
to the one using original data.  At a type-2 error rate of 10 percent, the revised and original data
produce type-1 error rates of 29.3 and 37.4 percent, respectively.  Using probabilities from the
binomial distribution, this substantial difference in type-1 error rate is statistically significant at
the 5-percent level.
Figures 2, 3, and 4 show in-sample error rates for the second, third, and fourth quarter
data, respectively.  The predictive superiority of the revised data remains evident for the second
quarter data shown in Figure 2, though the performance gap is considerably narrower than for the
first quarter data.  For the third quarter data, the original and revised data perform equally well. 
However, a large difference in performance reemerges when the fourth quarter data are used, as
shown in Figure 4.  At a type-2 error rate of 10 percent, the revised and original data produce
type-1 error rates of 29.7 and 38.1 percent, respectively.  And this difference is statistically
significant at the 5-percent level.
Combining the observations from all four quarters results in the tradeoff in error rates
shown in Figure 5.  Based on this summary measure, the revised data predict supervisory- 13 -
6 Only revised data are used in estimating the models, under the assumption that the revised data for 1996
and 1997 were available one year after the report date.
7 Even for the in-sample results, where the coefficients were allowed to differ across the two sets of data,
the differences in predictive performance are almost entirely the result of differences in the data values themselves,
as opposed to differences in the estimated coefficients.
downgrades more accurately than the originally reported data.  At a type-2 error rate of 10
percent, the revised and original data produce type-1 error rates of 31 and 36 percent,
respectively.  This difference in type-1 error rate is statistically significant at the 1-percent level.
4.4.  Out-of-sample error rates
The revised data match up with supervisory outcomes much better than the originally
reported data.  As an additional test of predictive capacity, we compare out-of-sample error rates
across the two sets of data.  Quarterly models estimated using revised data for 1996 and 1997 are
applied to both original and revised data for 1998.
6  Because only one set of regression
coefficients is estimated for each quarter, any difference in forecasts using the 1998 data are
attributable entirely to data revisions and not to differences in coefficient estimates.
7
As shown in Figure 6, the revised data forecast supervisory outcomes more accurately
than the originally reported data.  At a type-2 error rate of 10 percent, the revised and original
data produce type-1 error rates of 45.2 and 49.4 percent, respectively.  This difference in type-1
error rate is statistically significant at the 5-percent level.
5.  Conclusion
The findings reported here demonstrate the importance of revisions to banking data.  We
find evidence of a strong relationship between on-site exams and call report revisions.  And
while few banks have revised their call report in recent years, the revisions that have occurred
have tended to be substantial.  Rank orderings of banks, based on the indices underlying our- 14 -
probit models of exam results, differ substantially depending on whether the original or revised
data are applied to the estimated coefficients.  The difference in rank orderings manifests itself in
noticeably different error rates in predicting supervisory outcomes.  The revised data overstate
the accuracy of early warning models considerably.  We note though, that while accuracy is
substantially lower in real time than the revised data would suggest, the real-time data
nevertheless are useful in predicting downgrades.
Overall, the substantial effect of revisions on the accuracy of early warning models,
coupled with the finding of a relationship between revisions and exams, points to a substantial
auditing role for on-site exams.  Call report revisions, and particularly revisions to loan loss
provisions, provide a unique window through which to view the results of exam activity.  The
linkage between supervisory downgrades and upward revisions to provisions supports a
significant role for exams in uncovering financial problems and ensuring bank accounting
statements reflect them.
The final implication of our results that we wish to emphasize concerns the extensive use
of call report data in banking research.  Researchers that intend on using accounting data as it
was reported, which is required by event studies and other investigations dependent on the real-
time flow of information, must be aware of and control for the substantial call report revisions
that tend to occur among troubled banks, as documented here.          - 15 -
Table 1
Variable Means by Type of Revision, 1996–98
Revision First Quarter Second Quarter Third Quarter Fourth Quarter
CAP    




10.24         (24,985)
10.52   10.89  (248)
  9.95     9.75  (362)
10.29         (24,794)
10.91   11.29  (172)
10.36   10.15  (263)
10.42         (24,508)
10.40   11.29  (125)
10.18   10.00  (246)
10.19         (22,940)
10.55   10.72  (636)




    .22         (25,190)
    .35       .41  (208)
    .54       .45  (197) 
    .23         (24,920)
    .33       .40  (157)
    .50       .39  (152)
    .23         (24,662)
    .41       .49  (103)
    .47       .33  (114)
    .20         (23,539)
    .40       .41  (451)




    .35         (25,193)
    .58       .70  (213)
    .63       .61  (189)
    .35         (24,939)
    .51       .62  (158)
    .73       .64  (132)
    .35         (24,652)
    .43       .55  (115)
    .74       .66  (112)
    .32         (23,504)
    .56       .65  (490)




    .15         (25,222)
    .24       .53  (190)
    .35       .30  (183)
    .16         (24,932)
    .28       .56  (173)
    .29       .24  (124)
    .17         (24,654)
    .21        .31 (125)
    .35        .30 (100)
    .18         (23,433)
    .35       .52  (640)




  1.28         (25,010)
  1.17     1.33  (261)
  1.26       .92  (324)
  1.30         (24,785)
  1.20     1.33  (201)
  1.25       .96  (243)
  1.31         (24,514)
  1.43     1.67  (118)
  1.26     1.08  (247)
  1.24         (22,959)
  1.20     1.31  (601)




29.32         (25,114)
27.62   27.86  (241)
28.59   28.28  (240)
29.11         (24,878)
26.51   26.77  (178)
27.17   26.41  (173)
28.42         (24,619)
27.39   27.65  (126)
29.17   28.50  (134)
28.25         (23,347)
25.80    25.88 (586)




  9.73         (25,114)
10.96   11.12  (241)
11.38   11.11  (240) 
 9.77          (24,879)
11.10   11.43  (190)
10.84   10.52  (160)
  9.99         (24,620)
11.48   11.80  (133)
10.67   10.45  (126)
  9.90         (23,346)
11.79   11.92  (589)
11.74   11.63  (584)




    .15         (25,536)
    .25       1.81  (35)
    .58         .20  (24)
    .16         (25,145)
    .31       1.20  (54)
    .29         .09  (30)
    .17         (24,814)
    .31         .66  (38)
    .22         .05  (27)
    .18         (24,232)
    .42       .87  (245)
    .37         .19  (42)
NOTE: For revisions, the first entry is calculated using the originally reported call report data, the second using
subsequently revised data.  The number of instances is shown in parentheses.  The variables are multiplied by 100.  - 16 -
Table 2
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2 = 99.2






































2 = 47.4 
2 = 267.2
NOTE: Exam status refers to the results of exams in the first quarter following the call report date.  Column
percentages are in parentheses (may not sum to 100 due to rounding).  The likelihood ratio chi-square test statistic
under each frequency table is for the null hypothesis of no association between exam and revision category; each has
four degrees of freedom and is significant at the 1-percent level.- 17 -
Table 3
Probit Regression Results Using Original Data

















































































NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.  * significant at the 1-percent level.  † significant at the 5-percent level.- 18 -
Table 4
Probit Regression Results Using Revised Data

















































































NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.  * significant at the 1-percent level.  † significant at the 5-percent level.- 19 -
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Note: The type-1 error rate is the percentage of problem banks identified as nonproblem banks.  The
type-2 error rate is the percentage of nonproblem banks identified as problem banks.  The call report
data are for 1996-98.  The original data are from the date on which the data were first published as
“final” or closely thereafter.  The revised data are from May 2000.
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Note: The type-1 error rate is the percentage of problem banks identified as nonproblem banks.  The
type-2 error rate is the percentage of nonproblem banks identified as problem banks.  The call report
data are for 1996-98.  The original data are from the date on which the data were first published as
“final” or closely thereafter.  The revised data are from May 2000.
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Note: The type-1 error rate is the percentage of problem banks identified as nonproblem banks.  The
type-2 error rate is the percentage of nonproblem banks identified as problem banks.  The call report
data are for 1996-98.  The original data are from the date on which the data were first published as
“final” or closely thereafter.  The revised data are from May 2000.
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Note: The type-1 error rate is the percentage of problem banks identified as nonproblem banks.  The
type-2 error rate is the percentage of nonproblem banks identified as problem banks.  The call report
data are for 1996-98.  The original data are from the date on which the data were first published as
“final” or closely thereafter.  The revised data are from May 2000.
Error Rates Using Fourth Quarter Data to Predict
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Note: The type-1 error rate is the percentage of problem banks identified as nonproblem banks.  The
type-2 error rate is the percentage of nonproblem banks identified as problem banks.  The call report
data are for 1996-98.  The original data are from the date on which the data were first published as
“final” or closely thereafter.  The revised data are from May 2000.
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Note: The type-1 error rate is the percentage of problem banks identified as nonproblem banks.  The
type-2 error rate is the percentage of nonproblem banks identified as problem banks.  Quarterly
models estimated using revised data for 1996 and 1997 are applied to both original and revised data
for 1998. The original data are from the date on which the data were first published as “final” or
closely thereafter.  The revised data are from May 2000.
Out-of-Sample Error Rates in Forecasting Next Quarter’s
Downgrades
Figure 6